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Introduction
How can the jury judge between two statements each founded
upon an experience confessedly foreign in kind to their own? It
is just because they are incompetent for such a task that the ex-
pert is necessary at all.1
The use of experts in both criminal and civil trials is widespread,2
and has grown considerably in recent years. Because experts have
specialized knowledge and experience, judges and juries rely upon
them to clarify and illuminate complex issues that arise in trials.4
Indeed, a jury's ability to come to a reasoned judgment often
hinges on the testimony of an expert who, in passing on general
truths gathered from specialized experience, enables the jury to
fully comprehend the facts of a case.' Problems arise, however,
when juries must construe contradictory testimony from two peo-
ple who testify before them as "experts" on the same subject mat-
* J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 1999; B.A., Brown Uni-
versity, 1995. I would like to thank Professors James Kainen and Daniel Capra of
Fordham University School of Law and William Schmitz for their assistance through-
out the drafting of this Note. I also greatly appreciate the support of my family and
friends, especially my parents, Leslie and Jim Needham, whose encouragement is a
constant source of motivation.
1. Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testi-
mony, 15 HARV. L. REV. 40, 54 (1901).
2. See L. Timothy Perrin, Expert Witness Testimony: Back To The Future, 29 U.
RICH. L. REV. 1389, 1389 (1995).
3. See Hand, supra note 1, at 42-49; Jay P. Kesan, Note, An Autopsy of Scientific
Evidence In A Post-Daubert World, 84. GEo. L.J. 1985, 2041 (1996).
4. See Michael J. Polentz, Comment, Post-Daubert Confusion With Expert Testi-
mony, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1187, 1187 (1986).
5. See Hand, supra note 1, at 54.
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ter.6 At the crux of this issue is the importance of reliable expert
testimony. i.,
The increased reliance on expert testimony in trials7 has led to a
controversy among judges and litigators regarding the admissibility
of specialized, but nonscientific, expert testimony,8 and the appro-
priate standard for ensuring reliability.9 In 1993, the United States
Supreme Court clarified the admissibility of scientific evidence in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,1° and resolved a
split among the federal circuits' by creating guidelines for apply-
ing the Federal Rules of Evidence to scientific expert testimony. 12
Scientific testimony, however, is only one type of expert testi-
mony proffered, 3 and by addressing only this type of testimony,
the Supreme Court left open significant questions regarding the ad-
missibility of testimony that is not "scientific."' 4 While the recent
6. See United States v. Amarel, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1973) (stating that
juries are easily swayed by expert testimony as a result of "its aura of special reliabil-
ity and trustworthiness"); see also Polentz, supra note 2, at 1203 (stating that expert
testimony can be a powerful tool that has the potential to sway a decision one way or
another).
7. See Perrin, supra note 2, at 1391.
8. Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence addresses not only scientific testi-
mony but also that which is based on "technical or other specialized knowledge."
The rule provides: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." FED. R. EvID. 702. Nonscien-
tific testimony based upon "specialized" or "technical" knowledge comes from skilled
witnesses who are trained in a particular area or who have acquired specialized
knowledge through experience. See infra notes 32-45 and accompanying text (provid-
ing examples of skilled witnesses).
9. See Peter B. Oh, Assessing the Admissibility of Nonscientific Expert Evidence
Under Federal Evidence Rule 702, 64 DEF. COUNS. J. 556, 556 (1997) (stating that
ensuring the reliability of nonscientific testimony is "an increasingly common
problem").
10. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
11. The circuits were split over whether Rule 702 superseded the common law
"general acceptance" standard of admissibility of scientific expert testimony articu-
lated in Frye. Compare United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (1978) (stating that
Rule 702 superseded Frye) with Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106,
1110-12 (5th Cir. 1991) (stating that Rule 702 and Frye coexist). See infra note 48 and
accompanying text (discussing the circuit split). Daubert ultimately resolved this split
by developing a multi-factor test to ensure the reliability of scientific testimony. See
infra Part I.C.
12. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589 (holding that Frye was no longer the applicable
standard and that Rule 702 superseded Frye).
13. See FED R. EVIo. 702 (listing specialized and technical knowledge in addition
to scientific knowledge as potential bases for admissible testimony).
14. See Jennifer Laser, Note, Inconsistent Gatekeeping in Federal Courts: Applica-
tion of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. to Nonscientific Expert Testi-
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fear of "junk science '"15 in the courtroom is primarily associated
with scientific testimony, substantial risks are created by limiting
the focus of reliable testimony in trials to scientific inquiries.16 Evi-
dentiary problems are exacerbated when courts are faced with the
elusive concept of nonscientific expert testimony.
1 7
This Note examines the impact of the Daubert decision on non-
scientific testimony and proposes a standard for determining the
admissibility of such evidence. Part I describes the various legal
standards applied to determine the admissibility of scientific testi-
mony, including the common law test,18 Federal Rule of Evidence
70219 ("Rule 702"), and the Daubert factors.20 Part II illustrates
the split in the federal circuits regarding the application of Daubert
to nonscientific testimony and shows how courts, in recent years,
have grappled to ensure the reliability of such testimony. Part III
advocates the need to scrutinize the reliability of nonscientific testi-
mony and analyzes proposals for applying Daubert to nonscientific
testimony, extending Daubert's reliability requirement, and
amending Rule 702. This Note concludes by proposing an amend-
ment to Rule 702 that provides courts with the necessary frame-
work to incorporate a reliability requirement into the decision
whether to admit nonscientific expert testimony.
mony, 30 Loy. L.A. REV. 1379, 1381 (1997) ("While resolving the Frye controversy
over the need for general acceptance of scientific expert evidence, the Daubert inter-
pretation of Rule 702 left unanswered several important questions.").
15. See PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURT-
ROOM (1991) (demonstrating the negative effect junk science has had on the legal
process). "Junk Science" refers to baseless scientific claims that scientists do not ac-
cept. See Peter Huber, Junk Science in the Courtroom, 26 VAL. U.L. REV. 723, 753
(1992); Dick Thornburgh, Junk Science - The Lawyer's Ethical Responsibilities, 25
FORDHAM URB. L.J.-, - (1998).
16. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Next Step After Daubert: Developing A Simi-
larly Epistemological Approach To Ensuring The Reliability Of Nonscientific Expert
Testimony, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2271, 2273 (1994) (stating that there are doubts
about the reliability of nonscientific expert testimony which may prove to be less solu-
ble and more troublesome than the doubts about "junk science"); Laser, supra note
14, at 1379; see also Daubert, 509 U.S. at 600 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (expressing concern about how courts would apply Daubert when
faced with expert testimony based on nonscientific knowledge).
17. See Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1348 (6th Cir. 1993).
18. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
19. FED R. EVID. 702; see infra notes 26-34 and accompanying text.
20. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 600.
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXV
I. Background
A. The Frye Common Law Approach
Frye v. United States"1 established the common law standard for
determining the admissibility of scientific expert testimony.22 Frye
set forth a framework for trial judges, which became known as the
"general acceptance" test,23 whereby scientific testimony was not
admissible unless the methodology used by the expert was ac-
cepted in the general community of scientists.24 Frye provided a
two-step analysis for evaluating scientific testimony in which trial
judges: (i) identified the scientific field of the testimony; and, (ii)
determined whether the principle was generally accepted by scien-
tists in the same field.
Under Frye, judges did not examine the reliability of such testi-
mony, but rather they looked to the general community of scien-
tists to see if there was substantial agreement that the methodology
the expert employed was sound.26 Thus, a judge was required to
understand only enough about a scientific principle to gauge
whether it was generally accepted within the relevant community. 27
The Frye test was overly conservative, however, because expert tes-
timony based upon a newly developed methodology was rendered
21. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
22. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585 ("In the 70 years since its formulation in the Frye
case, the 'general acceptance' test has been the dominant standard for determining
the admissibility of novel scientific evidence."). Frye involved a murder trial in which
the defendant sought to admit the result of a systolic blood pressure deception test as
exculpatory evidence. See Frye, 293 F. at 1013. The defense's theory was that "con-
scious deception or falsehood, concealment of facts, or guilt of crime, accompanied by
fear of detection when the person is under examination, raises the systolic blood pres-
sure." Id. The scientist who conducted the test was not allowed to testify nor was he
allowed to administer the test to Frye in front of the jury. See id.
23. Id. at 1014; see also Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585-86 (discussing the Frye test).
24. See Frye, 293 F. at 1013. Before Frye, the general rule with regard to expert
testimony was that testimony offered by a qualified witness and which was relevant to
an issue was admissible and courts left the consideration of the weight of the testi-
mony to the jury. See, e.g., Carbonero Reading Co. v. Munson, 122 F. 753, 755 (1st
Cir. 1903); Golden Reward Min. Co. v. Buxton Min. Co. 97 F. 413, 416 (8th Cir. 1899);
St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. v. Edwards, 78 F. 745, 746 (8th Cir. 1897); Edward P. Allis Co.
v. Columbia Mill Co. 65 F. 52, 57 (8th Cir. 1894).
25. See Frye, 293 F. at 1014. Frye failed to clearly define "general acceptance,"
and thus subject the test to varied judicial interpretation. See Paul C. Gianelli, The
Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, A Half-Century Later,
80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1208 (1980) (citing a series of cases applying the Frye stan-
dard and demonstrating the courts' divergence in interpreting what constituted "gen-
eral acceptance").
26. See Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
27. See Kesan, supra note 3, at 1991 (asserting that the Frye test survived for over
half a century because it was "intrinsically well-suited" to the judiciary).
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inadmissible if it was not yet generally accepted. 8 Frye also was
criticized because it did not clearly define "general acceptance,"
causing courts to experience difficulty in ascertaining scientific
validity. 9
B. Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Alternative Tests
The application of Frye came into question after the enactment
of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 in 1975,30 which allows judges to
admit the testimony of a qualified expert if the testimony helps the
jury understand the evidence.31 Rule 702 applies to expert testi-
mony requiring technical knowledge, specialized knowledge, and
scientific knowledge. 32 Technical knowledge is knowledge of any-
thing "pertaining to or connected with the mechanical or industrial
arts and the applied sciences. ' 33 Specialized knowledge refers to
any knowledge focused on a particular area of study, profession, or
experience. 34 Examples of the myriad of experts who base testi-
mony on technical and specialized knowledge include police of-
ficers,35  accountants,36  bankers,37  lawyers,38  economists,39
28. See Frye, 293 F. at 1014; Kesan, supra note 3, at 2017-18.
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the ex-
perimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this
twighlight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and
while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a
well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the
deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general
acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs....
United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (noting that Frye's re-
quirement that a methodology gain general acceptance hinders the admissibility of
new methods); see also Constantine J. Maletskos & Stephen J. Spielman, Introduction
of New Scientific Methods in Court, 1 LAW ENFORCEMENT SCI. & TECH. 957, 958
(1967).
29. See United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1233 (3d Cir. 1985) (maintaining
that Frye was inconsistent with Rule 702). Frye did not explain how courts were to
determine "general acceptance." See Kesan, supra note 3, at 1991.
30. FED R. EVID. 702; see Daubert 509 U.S. at 587 n.5. (citing the circuit split over
whether Rule 702 superseded Frye); see also supra note 8 and accompanying text
(discussing Rule 702).
31. FED R. EvID. 702. According to Rule 702, an expert witness is qualified as an
expert by "knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education." And, as such, the
expert may give testimony containing "scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge" which would be helpful to the trier of fact. Id.
32. See id.
33. RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1831 (2d ed.
1987).
34. See id.
35. See Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342 (6th Cir. 1994).
36. See Frymire-Brinati v. KPMG Peat Marwick, 2 F.3d 183 (7th Cir. 1993).
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farmers 0 mechanics," engineers,42 social psychologists,4 3 experts
in drug trafficking,4" and real estate appraisers.45
Scientific knowledge differs from technical and specialized
knowledge because it is based on the concept of "Newtonian Sci-
ence," 46 which refers to the process of formulating a hypothesis,
and then engaging in experimentation or observation to verify or
falsify that hypothesis.47 Rule 702's inclusion of scientific knowl-
edge caused a split among the federal circuits regarding the appro-
priate standard to be applied for determining the admissibility of
scientific testimony.48 Partly because the rule and its legislative his-
tory did not mention the "general acceptance test,' 49 after 1975,
some courts concluded that Rule 702 superseded Frye. ° Other
courts, however, maintained that "general acceptance" was still a
requirement for the admissibility of scientific testimony.51
37. See Den Norske Bank AS v. First N at'l Bank of Boston, 75 F.3d 49 (1st Cir.
1996).
38. See United States v. Sinclair, 74 F.3d 753 (7th Cir. 1996).
39. See Marcel v. Placid Oil Co., 11 F.3d 563 (5th Cir. 1994).
40. See MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 702.1, at
614 (3d ed. 1991).
41. See Carmichael v. Samyang Tire, Inc., 131 F.3d 1433 (11th Cir. 1997).
42. See Roback v. V.I.P. Transp. Inc., 90 F.3d 1207 (7th Cir. 1996).
43. See United States v. Hall, 974 F. Supp. 1198 (C.D. Ill. 1997).
44. See United States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 225 (9th Cir. 1997).
45. See F.D.I.C. v. Suni Assoc., 80 F.3d 681 (2d Cir. 1996).
46. See Imwinkelried, supra note 16, at 2276.
47. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993). Justice Black-
mun referred to Newtonian Science in phrasing the admissibility standard in Daubert,
stating that a proposition supported by appropriate scientific methodology is consid-
ered scientific knowledge. See id. How conclusions were reached rather than what
the conclusions stated was the relevant inquiry. "The focus, of course, must solely be
on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate." Id. at 595;
see also ALBUREY CASTELL, AN INTRODUCTION TO MODERN PHILOSOPHY 170, 197
(2d ed. 1963).
48. Compare United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224,1.234 (3d Cir. 1985) (Frye is
inconsistent with Rule 702) with Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106,
1111 (5th Cir. 1991) (Frye and Rule 702 coexist). See supra note 11 and accompany-
ing text.
49. See FED. R. EVID. 702; Gianelli, supra'note 25, at 1999 (noting the omission of
Frye from advisory committee notes, congressional committee reports and Federal
Rules Hearings).
50. See, e.g., United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1234 (3d Cir. 1985) (finding
that the Frye test was inconsistent with Rule 702's broad scope of relevance); United
States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978) (stating that the Federal Rules of
Evidence superseded Frye).
51. See United States v. Christophe, 883 F.2d 1296, 1299 (9th Cir. 1987) (discussing
circuit cases requiring "general acceptance"); Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 769
F.2d 1128, 1142 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating that Rule 702 applies broadly).
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Several courts, in rejecting Frye, developed alternative admissi-
bility standards5" such as the "substantial acceptance" test.5 3 This
test diverged from Frye because it allowed testimony based upon a
scientific principle or technique to be admitted if it was accepted by
a substantial minority of experts in that area. 4
Courts and commentators also developed multi-factor reliability
tests.55 Such tests required the court to consider the following fac-
tors: the potential rate of error;56 the existence of standards; 57 how
clearly the technique and its results could be explained;58 any
analogous relationship with other scientific techniques usually ad-
mitted into evidence; 59 falsifiable characteristics; the experts' quali-
fications;60 general acceptance in the scientific community;61 the
novelty of the technique or principle;62 and the extent to which the
technique or principle relied on the subjective interpretation of the
expert.63 These tests suggested that trial judges play a more signifi-
cant role in evaluating the reliability of the testimony offered in
their courtrooms.64 Moreover, in providing a "gatekeeping" role
for judges, these tests were precursors to the Supreme Court's
multi-factor reliability standard presented in Daubert.65
52. See Kesan, supra note 3, at 1992.
53. United States v. Williams, 443 F. Supp. 269, 273 (S.D.N.Y 1977), affd, 583 F.
2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978). The substantial acceptance test required that the scientific
principle advanced be accepted by a "substantial section of the scientific community."
Id. at 273.
54. See id. This approach, while adhering to the notion that acceptance within the
community is the key indicator of reliability, was more liberal than the "general ac-
ceptance" test because it allowed more testimony to be heard in court. See Kesan,
supra note 3, at 1992.
55. See Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978); see also Bert Black, A Unified The-
ory of Scientific Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 595, 641-42 (1988) (discussing various
multi-factor reliability tests); J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, 3 WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE
702 at §§ 702-18 to 702-19 (1987) (providing a list of useful factors in assessing the
validity of scientific evidence); Mark McCormick, Scientific Evidence: Defining a New
Approach to Admissibility, 67 IOWA L. REV. 879, 911 (1982) (formulating eleven fac-
tors to be considered when evaluating scientific evidence).
56. See McCormick, supra note 55 at 911; see also United States v. Williams, 583
F.2d 1194, 1198-99 (2d Cir. 1978).
57. See WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 55, at 702-18.
58. See McCormick, supra note 55, at 911.
59. See id.
60. See WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 55, at 702-18.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993).
65. See Kesan, supra note 3, at 1996.
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C. The Daubert Decision
In order to resolve a split in the federal circuits,66 the Supreme
Court granted certiorari, in Daubert, to decide the issue of the ad-
missibility of expert testimony after Rule 702.67 In Daubert, the
Court explicitly rejected Frye and adopted a more liberal standard
for determining the admissibility of scientific testimony.6 The
Daubert Court held that Rule 702 superseded the Frye "general
acceptance" test, and found the Frye test "rigid and not comporting
with the 'liberal thrust' and 'permissive backdrop' of the Federal
Rules. "69
The Court set forth new criteria by which a court should evaluate
the admissibility of scientific testimony. The nonexclusive, nondis-
positive Daubert factors are: (i) the existence of a falsifiable meth-
odology;70 (ii) whether the theory or technique has been subject to
66. Compare United States v. Shorter, 809 F.2d 54, 59-60 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (apply-
ing Frye's "general acceptance" requirement) with DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharm.,
Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 955 (3d Cir. 1990) (refusing to apply the "general acceptance"
standard). See Paul Giannelli & Edward Imwinkelried, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 1-5,
at 10-14 (1986 & Supp. 1991).
67. 506 U.S. 914 (1992).
68. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585. Daubert involved a suit by two children, Jason
Daubert and Eric Schuller and their parents against Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
alleging that Bendectin, a drug marketed by Merrell Dow to combat morning sickness
had caused their birth defects when ingested by their mothers during pregnancy. See
id. at 579. The trial court ruled that the plaintiff's expert testimony was inadmissible
to establish causation because it failed to satisfy the "general acceptance" test from
Frye. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 727 F. Supp. 570, 572 (S.D. Cal. 1989). The
plaintiffs based causation on animal studies, the similarity in chemical structure be-
tween Bendectin and drugs which induce abnormal embryologic development, and
statistical reanalysis of previously published studies. See id. On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit affirmed. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 951 F.2d 1128 (1991). The Ninth
Circuit noted that other courts considering the risks of Bendectin were reluctant to
admit a reanalysis of epidemiological studies that had not been published or subject to
peer review stating that the unpublished testimony proffered by the plaintiffs was
"particularly problematic in light of the massive weight of the original published stud-
ies supporting the defendant's position, all of which has undergone full scrutiny from
the scientific community." Id. at 1130.
69. Id. at 593-94. The Court stated:
Nothing in the text of this Rule establishes "general acceptance" as an abso-
lute prerequisite to admissibility. Nor does respondent present any clear in-
dication that Rule 702 of the Rules as a whole were intended to incorporate
a "general acceptance" standard. The drafting history make no mention of
Frye, and a rigid "general acceptance" requirement would be at odds with
the "liberal thrust" of the Federal Rules and their "general approach of re-
laxing the traditional barriers to 'opinion testimony."'
Id. at 588.
70. The requirement of a falsifiable methodology compels judges to look for ob-
jective standards in the expert's testimony so that it might be tested and proven. See
id. at 579.
548
1998] ADMISSIBILITY OF NONSCIENTIFIC TESTIMONY 549
peer review and publication;71 (iii) the known or potential rate of
error analysis and the existence and maintenance of controls of the
technique's operation;72 and (iv) the degree to which the theory
has been generally accepted 73 in the scientific community. 74 Thus,
while "general acceptance" was still a factor in the test for admissi-
bility, it no longer was the only way scientific evidence could get
into the courtroom.75 Moreover, Daubert imposed a reliability re-
quirement in the form of a gatekeeping function for trial judges.
Pursuant to Daubert, courts were to assess the scientific validity of
scientific expert testimony by screening for unreliable evidence
rather than simply relying on "general acceptance" within the rele-
vant community. 76 The Daubert Court expressly stated that it was
only addressing the reliability of scientific expert testimony and left
open the question of nonscientific testimony.77
71. Peer review refers to the common practice of publishing scientific revelations
and subjecting conclusions to review and criticism from the scientific community. See
id.
72. This requirement ensures that the expert's methodology is employed the same
way every time and that the expert's conclusions are not based on a methodology that
has a high rate of error. See id.
73. This is the same "general acceptance" advanced in Frye. See id.; Frye, 293 F.
1013, 1013; see also supra, notes 21-29 and accompanying text (discussing Frye's "gen-
eral acceptance" test). However, the Daubert court merely listed "general accept-
ance" as one of the factors to be considered rather than the entire basis. See Daubert,
509 U.S. at 593. In addition, the Daubert court stated that courts should focus on the
expert's principles and methodology rather than the conclusions they generate. See
id. at 595. But see General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 118 S. Ct. 512, 518 (1997) (stating
that the trial judge might need to examine an expert's conclusions to determine
whether the data supports the conclusions which the testimony' is based on). In
Joiner, the Supreme Court addressed a split in the circuits regarding the standard of
review of the admission of scientific expert testimony. The Eleventh Circuit had ap-
plied a "particularly stringent" standard of review in reversing the district court's ex-
clusion of expert testimony, maintaining that its gatekeeping role was limited. Joiner
v. General Electric Co., 78 F.3d 523, 529-30 (11th Cir. 1996). The Eleventh Circuit
suggested that Daubert altered the standard of appellate review when it held that
Rule 702 superseded the "austere" Frye test. General Electric v. Joiner, 118 S. Ct.
512, 517 (1997). Holding that the "abuse of discretion" standard applied to the Dis-
trict Court's decision to exclude the scientific evidence, the Supreme Court reversed.
In doing so, the Court reiterated the significance of the judge's role as gatekeeper
noting that although Daubert did not address the standard of appellate review, it did
state "the fact that Rule 702 displaced the Frye test does not mean that the Rules do
not place limits on the admissibility of purportedly scientific evidence. Nor is the trial
judge disabled from screening such evidence." Id. at 516 (citing Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharm. 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993)).
74. See id. at 593-94.
75. See id. at 593.
76. See id.
77. The Court stated that Daubert "is limited to the scientific context because that
is the nature of the expertise offered here." Id. at 590 n.9. Thus, the Court did not
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In his dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist expressed concerns about
the Daubert majority's interpretation of Rule 702 and its applica-
tion to other types of testimony. 78 He questioned whether Daubert
would apply to "technical or other specialized knowledge," and if
there was a distinction between this type of testimony and the sci-
entific testimony addressed in the case. 79 Indeed, the Chief Jus-
tice's statement was a harbinger of the future uncertainty that
Daubert created.
II. The Divided Circuits
The federal circuits are now split on whether Daubert should ap-
ply to nonscientific expert testimony.80 The various standards ap-
plied for admissibility of nonscientific testimony range from a
literal application of Daubertl to a restrictive approach eliminating
any use of Daubert in the area of nonscientific testimony.82
preclude the possibility of extending a reliability requirement for the evaluation of
nonscientific expert testimony.
78. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 600 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).
Does all of this dicta apply to an expert seeking to testify on the basis of
technical or other specialized knowledge - the other types of expert knowl-
edge to which Rule 702 applies - or are the general observations limited
only to scientific knowledge? What is the difference between scientific
knowledge and technical knowledge?)
Id.
79. Id. Rehnquist also stated that the majority opinion failed to distinguish "scien-
tific" from "technical" knowledge. See id.
80. Compare Compton v. Subaru of Am., Inc., 82 F.3d 1513 (10th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 117 S. Ct 611 (1996) (finding that Daubert does not apply to nonscientific testi-
mony because it is based upon experience or training rather than methodology or
technique) and Den Norske Bank AS v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 75 F.3d 49 (1st
Cir. 1996) (relying on Daubert's reliability requirement and judicial "gatekeeping"
function to assess the validity of nonscientific testimony) with Berry v. City of Detroit,
25 F.3d 1342 (6th Cir. 1994) (applying Daubert's four factors directly to nonscientific
testimony). See Laser, supra note 14, at 1388 (noting that courts are clearly in conflict
on this issue and discussing the various approaches to evaluating the scope of Daubert
and its application to nonscientific testimony).
81. See Berry, 25 F.3d at 1349. This suggests applying the four Daubert factors,
falsifiable methodology; peer review and publication; rate of error and controls; and
general acceptance, to nonscientific testimony. See infra Part III.A.2. (noting that the
nature of nonscientific testimony may preclude the application of the four Daubert
factors).
82. See, e.g., Compton v. Subaru of Am., Inc., 82 F.3d 1513 (10th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 611 (1996); United States v. Arevalo-Gamboa, 69 F.3d 545 (9th Cir.
1995); Thomas v. Newton Int'l Enters., 42 F.3d 1266 (9th Cir. 1994); lacobelli Constr.,
Inc. v. County of Monroe, 32 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Amuso, 21 F.3d.
1251 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Muldrow, 19 F.3d 1332 (10th Cir. 1994).
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A. Refusing to Extend the Application of Daubert To
Nonscientific Testimony
Several circuits hold that the application of Daubert is limited to
scientific testimony.83 In narrowing the scope of Daubert, these
courts have declared that the special concerns associated with sci-
entific testimony do not arise with expert testimony that is based
on technical or specialized knowledge or skill.84
In Compton v. Subaru,85 the Tenth Circuit emphasized that
Daubert "had little bearing" on nonscientific testimony based on
an expert's experience and training,86 and that applying Daubert
was inappropriate when the testimony was based on general princi-
ples gathered from years of experience.87 In precluding the use of
Daubert, the Tenth Circuit reasoned that the Daubert factors apply
only when an expert relies upon a particular principle or methodol-
ogy, and held that the four factors do not apply when the expert is
merely relying on experience or training.88
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit limits the application of Daubert to
the evaluation of scientific testimony.89 It maintains that Daubert
83. See, e.g., Compton v. Subaru of Am., 82 F.3d 1513 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. de-
nied, 117 S. Ct. 611 (1996); United States v. Arevalo-Gamboa, 69 F.3d 545 (9th Cir.
1995); Thomas v. Newton Int'l Enters., 42 F.3d 1266 (9th Cir. 1994); Iacobelli Constr.,
Inc. v. County of Monroe, 32 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d
924 (2d Cir. 1993).
84. See McKendall v. Crown Control Corp., 122 F.3d 803, 807 (9th Cir. 1997);
United States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 225, 228 (9th Cir. 1997); Compton, 82 F.3d at 1519;
Thomas, 42 F.3d at 1270; lacobelli, 32 F.3d at 25.
85. 82 F. 3d 1513 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 611 (1996).
86. See Compton, 82 F.3d at 1519. Compton involved a products liability action
against Subaru in which the plaintiff's engineering expert testified to the defective
design of the roof support structures in the car because they permitted excessive roof
crush. See id. at 1516. In Compton, the court maintained that it did not need to
inquire into the reliability of the testimony because it was based on general engineer-
ing principles gathered from the expert's twenty-two years of experience as an auto-
motive engineer rather than any particular methodology. See id. at 1519. The court
limited the inquiry to a strict Rule 702 analysis as to the issues of relevancy, qualifica-
tions and helpfulness to the jury. See id. at 1520.
87. See id. at 1519.
88. See id. The court found that although the trial judge erred in relying on
Daubert, the expert testimony was admissible nonetheless in that it satisfied the re-
quirements of Rule 702. See id.
89. See McKendall v. Crown Control Corp., 122 F.3d 803 (9th Cir. 1997). In
reaching its conclusion that Daubert should not be applied, the McKendall court
closely associated itself with the decision in Compton, saying it found the decision
"instructive." Id. at 806. The court rejected a lower court's striking of a design expert
in a product liability case, holding that Daubert should never have been applied be-
cause the testimony proffered was not sufficiently scientific in nature. See id. at 807.
The court maintained that the expert's experience, training and knowledge of forklifts
made his testimony admissible under Rule 702 and that was the appropriate standard
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does not apply to nonscientific evidence, such as modus operandi
testimony,90 because it is based on specialized, rather than scien-
tific, knowledge. 91
The Second Circuit also has refused to apply Daubert to non-
scientific testimony, finding that reliance on Daubert is "mis-
placed" when the expert testimony does not "present the kind of
junk science problem that Daubert meant to address. ' 92 The Sec-
ond Circuit is reluctant to apply Daubert to nonscientific testi-
mony, such as descriptions of the operations of organized crime
families 93 and payroll review by an accountant, 94 because applying
Daubert to these types of testimony would be inconsistent with
Rule 702's inclusion of testimony based upon "knowledge, skill, ex-
perience, training or education. '95 The Second Circuit maintains
that because Rule 702 pertains to technical and specialized knowl-
edge, testimony based upon such knowledge is sufficiently ad-
dressed by the requirements of the rule.96
to be applied. See id. In a footnote, the court hinted that the reliability requirement
of Daubert may be extended to apply to all expert testimony. See id. at 806 n.1. The
court stated, "[i]f one views Daubert in a broader context, the Daubert Court is giving
strong advice to district courts: in ruling on the admissibility, trial judges are the gate-
keepers and should pay particular attention to the reliability of the expert and his or
her testimony," and "in that sense, Daubert applies to all expert testimony." Id. But
see Thomas v. Newton Int'l Enters., 42 F.3d 1266, 1270 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994) (explaining
that Daubert was clearly confined to the evaluation of scientific expert testimony be-
cause the special concerns associated with scientific testimony were not at issue when
evaluating testimony based on specialized knowledge and skill).
90. Modus operandi is a term used by police and prosecutors to describe the par-
ticular method of a criminal's activity. It refers to a distinct pattern of behavior so
that separate crimes or conduct are recognized as the work of the same person. See
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1004 (6th ed. 1990).
91. See United States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 225 (9th Cir. 1997). In Cordoba, an
expert was to testify that sophisticated drug traffickers do not entrust 300 kilograms of
cocaine to someone unaware of what they are carrying. The court admitted the testi-
mony under Rule 702, rejecting the defendant's argument that it should be excluded
under Daubert, stating "Daubert applies only to the admission of scientific testi-
mony." Id. at 230.
92. lacobelli Constr., Inc. v. County of Monroe, 32 F.3d 19, 25 (2d Cir. 1994) (find-
ing that Daubert could not be applied to the testimony of an underground construc-
tion consultant). But see F.D.I.C. v. Suni Assoc., 80 F.3d 681 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding a
methodology whereby an expert used direct sales comparison and income capitaliza-
tion valuations).
93. See United States v. Locasio, 6 F.3d 924, 936 (2d Cir. 1993).
94. See Tamarin v. Adam Caterers, Inc., 13 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 1993).
95. See id.; Locascio, 6 F.3d at 936.
96. See Locascio, 6 F.3d at 936.; see also infra, note 118-120 and accompanying text
(noting the inconsistent logic with the Second Circuit's position because Rule 702
addresses scientific testimony, yet Daubert is applied as an extra precaution to verify
the reliability of the testimony).
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B. Applying Daubert's Reliability Requirement To
Nonscientific Testimony
The First, Third, and Fifth Circuits have imposed Daubert's
"gatekeeping" function on trial judges reviewing nonscientific ex-
pert testimony, requiring them to carefully screen both the compe-
tency of the expert and the reliability of the testimony in
question.97 In assessing the reliability of nonscientific expert testi-
mony, these courts usually determine whether the testimony in
question is based on a particular methodology. 9s If the method can
be explained, and is found to be reliable by the judge, the testi-
mony is admitted.99
In Watkins v. Telsmith,100 the Fifth Circuit recently maintained
that the Daubert factors are relevant in evaluating other types of
expert testimony for which a particular methodology cannot be
identified. 10 1 The Watkins court stated that the decision of the
97. See Den Norske Bank AS v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 75 F. 3d 49, 57-58 (1st
Cir. 1996) (applying Daubert in evaluating the reliability of testimony from a banker
who throughout his forty year career had become familiar with the types of agree-
ments in question and noting the trial court's gatekeeping function in determining the
competency of the expert and the reliability of the testimony); Habecker v. Clark
Equipment Co., 36 F.3d 278, 290 (3d Cir. 1994) (excluding the testimony of an acci-
dent simulation expert following Daubert's requirement of a preliminary assessment
of the validity of the expert's methodology, while not inquiring into the peer review,
general acceptance, testability or error rate requirements of Daubert); see also United
States v. Kayne, 90 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 1996) (finding an expert's testimony on the valua-
tion of rare coins reliable because the methods used were clearly explained); United
States v. 14.38 Acres of Land, 80 F.3d 1074 (5th Cir. 1996); Pedraza v. Jones, 71 F.3d
194 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Velasquez, 64 F.3d 844 (3d Cir. 1995) (finding
Daubert's reliability requirement helpful in the admission of handwriting testimony
because the methodology underlying handwriting analysis could be examined); Mar-
cel v. Placid Oil Co., 11 F.3d 563 (5th Cir. 1994).
98. See Velasquez, 64 F.3d at 845 n.2 (finding that a handwriting expert based her
conclusions on a clear methodology).
. 99. See id.; United States v. 14.38 Acres of Land, 80 F.3d 1074 (5th Cir. 1996)
(admitting the testimony of a civil engineer because the court believed the testimony
to be reliable as it was based upon a thorough inspection of the property in question
as well as maps and photographs); Marcel v. Placid Oil Co., 11 F.3d 563 (5th Cir.
1994) (excluding the testimony of an economist because the expert did not base his
conclusions on sufficient data, thereby rendering the testimony unreliable).
100. See Watkins v. Telsmith, Inc., 121 F.3d 984 (5th Cir. 1997).
101. The Watkins court stated that the view asserted by the Tenth Circuit, in
Compton, that Daubert is completely inapplicable to nonscientific testimony is unten-
able. See id. at 991. The court stated that this assertion leads to the proposition that,
experts who purport to rely on general engineering principles and practical
experience might escape screening by the district court simply by stating that
their conclusions were not reached by any particular method or technique.
The moral of this approach would be, the less factual support for an expert's
opinion, the better.
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102Tenth Circuit, in Compton, was untenable because it allows ex-
perts who rely on general principles and practical experience to
escape screening simply because their conclusions were not
reached by any particular methodology, and thus not scientific
enough to warrant a Daubert inquiry. 103 The Watkins court de-
manded judicial gatekeeping for all types of expert testimony, re-
gardless of whether the expert's conclusions rest on a methodology
or technique. 4
C. Applying Daubert Inconsistently
The Sixth,0 5 Seventh, °6 and Eighth0 7 Circuits have applied
Daubert inconsistently. Although the Sixth Circuit is the only
court to apply the Daubert test literally to nonscientific testi-
Id. Loretta Watkins brought this suit after her husband was killed when a wire rope
supporting a conveyor belt snapped and the conveyor fell on him. She sought to
admit the testimony of Marcus Dean Williams who had received a degree in civil
engineering, was a B-17 pilot in World War II and worked in an engineering and tool
design facility for Boeing. In addition, Williams taught drafting, surveying, structural
design and engineering at a junior college. See id. at 984-87. However, despite these
credentials, the court maintained that William's testimony "lacked the requisite indi-
cia of reliability to derive from scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge"
because the methodology he used to determine the existence of alternative designs.
See id. at 991. The flawed methodology included the lack of testing of any of the
proposed alternatives rendering the testimony inadmissible. See id. at 990. Thus,
while the court implemented the Daubert's reliability standard to exclude the testi-
mony, it also considered the other aspects of Daubert-like methodology and applied it
to technical, rather than strictly scientific knowledge. See id.
102. See Compton v. Subaru of Am., 82 F.3d 1513, 1519 (10th Cir. 1996) (stating
that Daubert is completely inapplicable to nonscientific testimony because it is not
based on a methodology or technique); supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
103. See Watkins, 121 F.3d at 991 ("[I]t seems exactly backwards that experts who
purport to rely on general engineering principles and practical experience might es-
cape screening by the district court simply by stating that their conclusions were not
reached by any particular method or technique.").
104. See id.
105. Compare United States v. Kremser Jones, 107 F.3d 1147 (6th Cir. 1997) (ad-
mitting testimony using only a Rule 702 analysis without any Daubert inquiry) with
Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342 (6th Cir. 1994) (excluding testimony because it
failed to meet the four Daubert factors).
106. Compare Deimer v. Cincinnati Sub-Zero Prods., Inc., 58 F.3d 341 (7th Cir.
1995) (excluding an expert witness's testimony because it lacked reliability as required
by Daubert) with United States v. Williams, 81 F. 3d 1434, 1441-42 (7th Cir. 1996)
(admitting testimony pursuant to a Rule 702 analysis without making any Daubert
inquiry as to the reliability of the testimony).
107. Compare United States v. Johnson, 28 F.3d 1487 (8th Cir. 1995) (admitting
testimony because it satisfied Rule 702 rather than making a Daubert reliability in-
quiry) with Ventura v. Titan Sports, 65 F.3d 725 (8th Cir. 1995) (applying Daubert's
reliability requirement and finding the testimony to be reliable because it was based
on a sound methodology).
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mony, °8 it also has limited the extension of the Daubert factors
when the proffered testimony was nonscientific."0 9 Similarly, the
Seventh Circuit has stated that courts should always assess the reli-
ability of an expert's methodology,' while failing to make
Daubert inquiries in several cases."' The Eighth Circuit also has
inconsistently applied Daubert to nonscientific testimony. In some
instances, it has followed only the requirements of Rule 702,12
while inquiring into the reliability of the testimony in other
cases. 113 Within each circuit, whether Daubert is applied to non-
108. See Berry, 25 F.3d at 1342. In Berry, the expert testimony came from a retired
sheriff who had a degree in sociology and four years work experience at the Depart-
ment of Justice. See id. at 1348. He was called to testify to whether a police depart-
ment's failure to discipline officers was the proximate cause of a police officer
shooting a victim. See id. The court applied Daubert, and found that the testimony
failed because there was no indication that the expert's theory had been formally
tested, published and subjected to peer review, or accepted by other experts in the
field. See id. at 1350-51. The Berry court noted that the proper foundation for a
technical expert is the demonstration of "first hand familiarity" with the subject and
that the use of empirical examples is one way to establish familiarity. Id.
109. See United States v. Kremser Jones, 107 F.3d 1147 (6th Cir. 1997). In Kremser
Jones, the court rejected a request to treat a handwriting expert's testimony as scien-
tific testimony, citing the Daubert Court's assertion that it was "quite convinced that
handwriting examiners do not concentrate on proposing and refining theoretical ex-
planations about the world, but instead use their knowledge and experience to answer
the extremely practical question of whether a signature is genuine or forged." Id. at
1157 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590). The court also noted the lack of empirical
evidence in handwriting analysis. Id. But see United States v. Velasquez, 64 F.3d 844,
845 (3d Cir. 1995) (concluding that Daubert is helpful to assist the court in evaluating
the reliability of the methodology underlying handwriting analysis). The Kremser
Jones court admitted the testimony using a Rule 702 analysis, reasoning that "Daubert
does not create a new framework" for technical or specialized testimony and that if
Daubert were extended outside the realm of scientific testimony, "many types of rele-
vant and reliable expert testimony - that derived substantially from practical experi-
ence - would be excluded." Id. at 1158.
110. See, e.g., Roback v. V.I.P. Transp. Inc., 90 F.3d 1207 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding an
engineering expert's testimony reliable because it was based upon a technique which
was subject to verification); Deimer, 58 F.3d at 343-45 (finding that a product design
expert was unreliable because he did not support his conclusions with a reliable meth-
odology); Frymire-Brinati v. KPMG Peat Marwick, 2 F.3d 183, 186-87 (7th Cir. 1993)
(stating the importance of analyzing the validity of the witness's reasoning as required
by Daubert).
111. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 81 F.3d 1434, 1441-42 (7th Cir. 1996) (af-
firming the admission of testimony by a witness familiar with a street gang's code
using a traditional Rule 702 evaluation without any reliability inquiry); United States
v. Sinclair, 74 F.3d 753, 757-58 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that Daubert's reliability re-
quirement had no relevance to the admissibility of a legal expert's testimony).
112. See Johnson, 28 F.3d at 1496-97 (admitting testimony of a drug trafficking ex-
pert on the grounds that it was helpful to the jury rather than any inquiry into the
reliability of the testimony).
113. See Ventura, 65 F.3d at 733 (admitting testimony of an expert testifying to the
market rate of royalties for licensing intellectual property on the grounds that the
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scientific testimony often rests on whether the expert has relied
upon a methodology or technique, thereby classifying the testi-
mony as more or less scientific, and more or less subject to a
Daubert inquiry.114
III. The Reliability of Nonscientific Testimony Must
Be Ensured
A. Implications of Daubert Why There Is a Need to Ensure
the Reliability of Nonscientific Testimony
Although Daubert clarified the framework for determining the
admissibility of scientific testimony, significant ambiguity remains
with respect to the standard for admitting nonscientific expert
testimony. 15
The application of Rule 702 to nonscientific testimony 16 is prob-
lematic because the rule lacks a reliability requirement.' 17 The reli-
ability of scientific testimony is protected by the Daubert
standard118 and the requirements of Rule 702,119 but no such judi-
cial standard exists to govern the admissibility of nonscientific evi-
testimony was reliable because the expert used a known methodology as well as the
helpfulness to the jury).
114. Courts are more likely to apply Daubert when the expert demonstrates a par-
ticular methodology. Compare Johnson, 28 F.3d at 1496-97 (making no reliability in-
quiry into the testimony of a drug trafficking expert whose conclusions were not
based upon any explanatory methodology) and Carmichael v. Samyang Tire, Inc., 131
F.3d 1433 (11th Cir. 1997) (finding that the testimony of an expert on tire failure was
not "scientific" and thus was not subject to a Daubert inquiry) with Ventura, 65 F.3d at
733 (finding that an economist's testimony regarding the market rate for licensing
royalties was admissible because the expert used a sound methodology) and
Peitzmeier v. Hennessy Indus., Inc., 97 F. 3d 293 (8th Cir. 1996) (applying the Daubert
factors to exclude a design engineering expert's testimony on alternative safety de-
vices because the expert had not subjected his conclusions to testing and peer review).
See Tyus v. Urban Search Management, 102 F.3d 256 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that
Daubert's framework for assessing scientific expert testimony applies to the social
sciences in which testimony is commonly grounded in a particular methodology); infra
Part III.A. (discussing that engineering testimony is more suited to a Daubert inquiry
because it is often based on a methodology which can be falsified whereas the testi-
mony like that from legal expert or an expert on drug trafficking cannot always be
similarly falsified).
115. See supra Part II (discussing the circuit split with respect to the standard for
admission of nonscientific testimony).
116. FED. R. EvID. 702 (requiring the trial judge to simply screen for a qualified
expert who can help the jury with relevant subject matter without screening for the
reliability of the testimony); see supra Part II.B.
117. See infra Part III.C. (proposing an amendment to Rule 702 to resolve this
dilemma).
118. See supra notes 68-77 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
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dence.120  Although courts have limited the application of
Daubert,12 1 judges should not examine less rigorously the special-
ized knowledge underlying nonscientific testimony, or abdicate
their role as gatekeeper when making a Rule 702 evaluation. 122
1. Distinguishing Scientific Knowledge From Specialized and
Technical Expertise
How courts are to distinguish between the scientific knowledge
defined in Daubert'23 and technical or other specialized knowledge
mentioned in Rule 702124 remains a central question in determining
the admissibility of nonscientific testimony.1 25 Daubert did not ex-
plain how courts were to make this differentiation.1 26 Moreover,
the Supreme Court did not specify how judges would be able to
place specific areas of expertise into these "presumably distinguish-
able" categories. 7 The Daubert Court attempted to provide some
guidance on this issue by resting the key inquiry as to whether
120. See supra Part II (discussing circuit split with respect to the standard for admit-
ting nonscientific testimony).
121. See supra notes 83-96 and accompanying text (discussing the circuit courts re-
fusing to apply Daubert to nonscientific testimony).
122. See United States v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. 1027, 1042 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
("The fact that Daubert does not apply to nonscientific expertise does not suggest.that
judges are without an obligation to evaluate proffered expert testimony for reliabil-
ity."); see also United States v. Jose Farias Ochoa 116 F.3d 487 (9th Cir. 1997).
123. That is, conclusions based on testing and experimentation as defined by
"Newtonian Science." See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
125. Indeed this was Judge Rehnquist's concern in his dissent. See Daubert v. Mer-
rell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 600 (1993) (Rehnquist C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
126. See supra note 8.
127. Diana K. Sheiness, Note and Comment, Out of the Twilight Zone: The Implica-
tions of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 69 WASH. L. REV. 481, 491
(1994) (discussing the risk that courts may develop their own criteria for applying
Daubert which will be inconsistent as some courts apply Daubert narrowly and others
may extend the standard beyond its intended reach). See also Carmichael v. Samyang
Tire, Inc., 131 F.3d 1433, 1436. The Carmichael court provided an interpretation of
the differences between scientific and nonscientific testimony using the example of an
auto mechanic analyzing a burned out spark plug.
Given a proper foundation, a mechanic with years of experience with spark
plugs might be able to identify for a jury burns or other marks on a spark
plug that he believes disclose whether the plug burned out because of nor-
mal wear or some defect; an experienced mechanic may recognize patterns
of normal and abnormal wear on an auto part even though he has no knowl-
edge of the principles of physics or chemistry that might explain why or how
a spark plug works. Such a mechanic's testimony would be non-scientific,
while the testimony of another expert on the nature and effects of combus-
tion (applied to spark plugs) would be scientific.
Id. at 1436.
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proffered testimony was scientific on the ability to confirm the the-
ory through experimentation and testing. 128 The Daubert factors,
therefore, were tailored to suit the specific methods used in reach-
ing a scientific conclusion. 129 Moreover, any conclusions reached
in a manner other than through a particular methodology are not
considered scientific within the purview of Rule 702,130 and thus
are arguably not subject to the Daubert factors because the
Daubert Court did not address nonscientific expert testimony.' 3'
Experience is to nonscientific experts what experimentation is to
scientists.1 32 That a nonscientific expert's basis for conclusion can-
not be tested because it is based upon individual experience should
not warrant less scrutiny of the reliability of the testimony. 133 Sci-
entific testimony may be validated through duplication of the ex-
pert's methodology,3 whereas it is seldom possible to duplicate a
nonscientific expert's subjective experience. 35
For example, an expert testifying to the causation of various ail-
ments resulting from exposure to toxins may use a dose-response
128. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593 ("Ordinarily, a key question to be answered in
determining whether a theory or technique is scientific knowledge that will assist the
trier of fact will be whether it can be (and has been) tested."); see also Sheiness, supra
note 127, at 490 ("If an expert derives authority from a field susceptible to testing but
offers an opinion that eludes empirical confirmation, the testimony should be ex-
cluded. However, a requirement of empirical testing for testimony whose sources are
not susceptible to verification would be too restrictive.").
129. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593 (stating the factors which bear significance when
assessing the validity of scientific methodologies); see also infra notes 151-64 (discuss-
ing how the Daubert factors are better suited to assess the reliability of scientific
rather than nonscientific testimony).
130. See Laser, supra note 14 at 1405; see also Sheiness, supra note 127, at 492
(noting the potential for dilemmas for judges when they are confronted with testi-
mony based on areas of expertise that could apply scientific methods but typically do
not, and citing Hawthorne Partners v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 1398
(N.D. I11. 1993), as resolving this dilemma by presuming the validity of testimony
when others in the same field used a similar method).
131. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 n.8 (stating that the Court's discussion is limited
to the scientific context because that was the nature of the expertise offered in the
case).
132. See Imwinkelried, supra note 16, at 2289 (stating that the expertise of non-
scientific experts stems from their experience, rather than methodological
experimentation).
133. Sheiness, supra note 127, at 492.
134. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, A Comparative Law Analysis of the Standard for
Admitting Scientific Evidence: The United States Stands Alone, 42 FORENSIC SCI. INT'L
15, 23 (1989) (stating that the nature of scientific evidence adds to the accuracy of the
testimony because another scientist can replicate the scientific research).
135. Presumably, individual experts will have varying experiences throughout their
respective careers and thus, it follows that one expert may not always be able to verify
the conclusions another draws from his or her own particular experience.
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analysis in which the expert evaluates the dosage of the toxins
plaintiffs allegedly received as well as the toxin levels of the alleged
source. Another expert may obtain data from the plaintiffs and the
alleged source, and perform the same methodology to conclude
that plaintiffs had been subjected to an exposure high enough to
cause their ailments. With respect to either expert, there will be
hard data to prove or disprove the reliability of the expert's conclu-
sions. Conversely, the testimony of an expert on the modus oper-
andi of a drug dealer cannot be confirmed or refuted simply
because another witness maintains to have seen a particular type of
drug deal conducted in a dissimilar manner.136 Thus, subjective
variations can be implemented in nonscientific testimony, yielding
a greater need to ensure its reliability. 137
Today, a jury faced with nonscientific testimony must base the
analysis of an expert on his or her credibility and whether the testi-
mony appears to be sound.138 No safeguards exist, however, to en-
sure that the testimony actually is sound. Pursuant to Daubert, the
trial judge screens scientific testimony for relevance and the ex-
pert's qualifications, as well as the reliability of the expert's conclu-
sions.139 If judges do not fulfill a gatekeeping function for
determining the admissibility of nonscientific testimony, then it is
simply being presumed that experts' conclusions are reliable be-
cause the experts are qualified.140 Establishing that an expert is
136. See Cordoba, 104 F.3d at 229; Perrin, supra note 2 at 1457-58.
137. See Perrin, supra note 2 at 1455 ("[nlonscientific expert testimony deserves
even greater skepticism because there is often no ability to test the technical expert's
theories or techniques or to prove false the expert's underlying premise"). But see
Jonathan R. Schofield, Note, A Misapplication of Daubert: Compton v. Subaru of
America Opens The Gate For Unreliable and Irrelevant Expert Testimony, 1997
B.Y.U.L. REV. 489, 507-08 (stating that any expert opinion, including nonscientific
opinions, "should be logically founded upon some methodology, reasoning, or princi-
ple," and that, "otherwise the opinion would be merely unsupported speculation").
138. FED. R. EvID. 702. Judges assess the qualifications of the witness and whether
the testimony will be helpful to the jury. See id. However, absence of any reliability
requirement in Rule 702 places the burden of evaluating the reliability of the expert's
conclusions on the jury.
139. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596. Those courts which maintain that Rule 702 suffi-
ciently covers nonscientific testimony simply because the rule refers to "specialized"
and "technical" knowledge ignore the fact that Rule 702 also mentions "scientific"
knowledge, yet there is an additional reliability requirement for scientific testimony.
See also United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 936 (2d Cir. 1993) (stating that testi-
mony based on specialized knowledge is sufficiently addressed by the requirements of
Rule 702).
140. See Oh, supra note 9, at 563 (arguing that an emphasis on credentials is "misdi-
rected," and that, "unlike assessing the methodologies and principles underlying a
field, examining an individual's background provides no assurance that the expert will
present valid views"); John William Strong, Language and Logic In Expert Testimony:
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXV
well qualified does not necessarily prove a correlation between the
expert's knowledge and the matter at issue in a case.14' Conse-
quently, a uniform standard must be applied that will require that
judges ensure the reliability of all testimony. 142
2. Debunking The Notion That Nonscientific Testimony Requires
Less Scrutiny
Many courts and commentators reason that scientific testimony
requires a heightened standard of scrutiny because the nature of
such evidence is complex and beyond the comprehension of most
jurors. 143 Courts may give less scrutiny to nonscientific testimony
because they believe the cost of erroneously admitting this type of
testimony is low. 144 The jury is better able to evaluate the non-
scientific expert's credibility because the information is more com-
mon to them.145 Thus, if the risk of misinterpretation is less, then
less scrutiny is required. This argument presents two problems.
Limiting Expert Testimony By Restrictions of Function, Reliability, and Form, 71 OR.
L. REV. 349, 363 (1992) (stating that the result of the traditional approach to admit-
ting expert testimony is that the question of reliability of the testimony is "conve-
niently subsumed under the question of the qualification of the expert witness").
141. See Oh, supra note 9, at 563.
142. See Part III.B.5. (proposing a uniform standard).
143. See Reed v. State, 391 A.2d 364, 370 (Md. 1978); Gianelli, supra note 25, at
1237 (stating that scientific evidence has a potential danger of misleading the jury
because "an aura of scientific infallibility may shroud the evidence"); Strong, supra,
note 137, at 367 (stating that a distinction is needed between scientific and other types
of experts because "propositions perceived as "scientific" by the jury possess an un-
usually high degree of persuasive power) (citing United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d
741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (noting that testimony from scientific experts may "assume a
posture of mystic infallibility in the eyes of jury of laymen")).
144. See Perrin, supra note 2, at 1425 (discussing the "relationship between the
standard for admitting and excluding expert testimony and the testimony's perceived
effect on the jury").
145. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Is Science a Special Case: The Admissibility of
Scientific Evidence After Daubert v. Merrell Dow, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1779 (1995). The
argument follows that although Daubert imposed a gatekeeping requirement for sci-
entific expert testimony, other "shaky" evidence is adequately addressed by the ad-
versary system. See Carmichael v. Samyang Tire, Inc., 131 F.3d 1433, 1435 (11th Cir.
1997). As stated by the court in United States v. 14.38 Acres of Land, 80 F.3d 1074,
1078 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1995)):
The trial court's role as gatekeepers is not intended to serve as a replace-
ment for the adversary system. Vigorous cross-examination presentation of
contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the
traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible
evidence.
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First, nonscientific expert testimony is still expert testimony, im-
plying knowledge beyond the average juror.11 6 Science is often ac-
corded more scrutiny because of the disparity in expertise between
the jury and the expert. 147 That an expert has been called, how-
ever, indicates that he or she has some special knowledge that the
jury may benefit from. 148 It is no less important, therefore, that
judges guarantee the reliability of nonscientific testimony so that
the jury is not confused and does not give undue weight to unrelia-
ble testimony.1 4
9
Varying degrees of the risk of misinterpretation should not dic-
tate whether or not the testimony is reliable. 150 Nonscientific testi-
mony should be just as reliable as scientific testimony if jurors are
to make well informed decisions. Furthermore, it should not be
assumed that a jury, without judicial gatekeeping, will necessarily
have an easier task in assessing the reliability of nonscientific ex-
pert testimony simply because an expert does not use a compli-
cated methodology to reach his or her conclusion. 15' A jury may
be as confused when evaluating the testimony of an expert in bank-
ing or legal standards of care as they are when hearing DNA
testimony.1 5
2
146. By definition an expert, scientific or nonscientific, helps the jury understand
something of which they do not possess sufficient knowledge. See BLACK'S LAW Dic-
TIONARY 578 (6th ed. 1990) (defining expert as "one who by reason of education or
special experience has knowledge respecting a subject matter about which persons
having no particular training are incapable of forming an accurate opinion or making
a correct deduction"). But see supra note 143 (discussing the view that scientific testi-
mony is different than technical and specialized expert testimony because of the "aura
of infallibility" surrounding scientific evidence in the eyes of the jury).
147. The argument follows that a juror is more likely to question testimony on a
familiar topic because the juror possesses sufficient knowledge to do so whereas with
complex, scientific knowledge, a juror is more likely to assume the truth of the testi-
mony. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
148. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
149. See Tyus v. Urban Search Management, 102 F.3d 256, 263 (7th Cir. 1996) (stat-
ing the obligation of the district court to ensure that it is dealing with an expert in all
cases including when the expertise is based on experience or training).
150. See id. ("A trial court is not compelled to exclude expert testimony 'just be-
cause the testimony may, to a greater or lesser degree, cover matters that are within
the average juror's comprehension.") (citing United States v. Hall, 93 F.3d 1337, 1342
(7th Cir. 1996)).
151. See Laser, supra note 14, at 1407.
152. See id.; Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1349 (6th Cir. 1994) (stating that
the difficulties associated with the admissibility of expert testimony "are exacerbated
when courts must deal with the even more elusive concept of nonscientific testi-
mony"). The Berry court provided the example of an expert testifying how a bumble-
bee is able to fly to illustrate the differences between scientific and nonscientific
testimony and to support the view that nonscientific experts offer knowledge beyond
that of the average juror which must be as well founded as scientific testimony. Id.
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Secondly, if nonscientific testimony is subjected to a lower stan-
dard of reliability, parties will be able to mold expert testimony to
fit into a nonscientific category simply to escape Daubert's height-
ened scrutiny. 153 The circuit split has resulted partly because courts
have attempted to categorize various types of nonscientific testi-
mony as more or less suited to the four Daubert factors.'54 The
more an expert arrives at his or her conclusions through some ob-
jective standard, the closer courts examine the reliability of the tes-
timony, often applying the Daubert factors.'55 Therefore, the
reliability requirement mandated by Daubert may be circumvented
simply by stating that an expert's conclusions are based on experi-
ence or education rather than any particular methodology. 156 The
If one wanted to explain to a jury how a bumblebee is able to fly, an aero-
nautical engineer might be a helpful witness. Since flight principles have
some universality, the expert could apply general principles to the case of
the bumblebee. Conceivably, even if he had never seen a bumblebee, he still
would be familiar with its component parts. On the other hand, if one
wanted to prove that bumblebees always take off into the wind, a beekeeper
with no scientific training at all would be an acceptable expert witness if a
proper foundation were laid for his conclusions. The foundation would not
relate to his formal training, but to his firsthand observations. In other
words, the beekeeper does not know any more about flight principles than
the jurors, but he has seen a lot more bumblebees than they have.
See id. See also Imwinkelried, supra note 16, at 2279 (noting that the reliability of
nonscientific expert testimony is just as suspect as that of scientific testimony).
153. See United States v. Kremser Jones, 107 F.3d 1147, 1156 (6th Cir. 1997) (re-
jecting appellant's argument that handwriting analysis constitutes scientific evidence,
and therefore subject to Daubert scrutiny); United States v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp.
1027, 1036-37 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (rejecting opposing party's attempt to cast forensic
document expertise as scientific knowledge to warrant greater reliability scrutiny); see
also supra note 141 and accompanying text.
154. Real estate appraisal is a good example of nonscientific testimony that is often
admitted under Daubert because the expert is able to demonstrate a clear methodol-
ogy. See F.D.I.C. v. Suni Assoc., 80 F.3d 681, 686 (2d Cir. 1996) (admitting the testi-
mony of a real estate appraiser upon finding the testimony reliable because the expert
used sound valuation methodologies); Ventura v. Titan Sports, Inc., 65 F.3d 725, 733
(8th Cir. 1995) (same); see also Ohio v. Louis Trauth Dairy Inc., 925 F. Supp. 1247,
1252 (S.D. Ohio 1996) (applying the peer review and general acceptance Daubert
factors to an economists testimony).
155. See Compton v. Subaru of Am., 82 F.3d 1513, 1518 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding
that Daubert's reliability requirement is not necessary when an expert does base his
conclusions on a particular methodology).
156. See Carmichael v. Samyang Tire, Inc., 131 F.3d 1433, 1434 (11th Cir. 1997). In
Carmichael, the plaintiff-appellants argued that the district court should not have re-
lied on Daubert's heightened scrutiny to exclude a tire failure expert because the testi-
mony was not "scientific." Id. at 1434; see also Schofield, supra note 134, at 490
(stating that the Compton court, in holding that Daubert was inapplicable to an expert
who based his opinion on experience, "created a gaping loophole" by which parties
could avoid Daubert's reliability scrutiny and, "as a result opened the gate for the
admissibility of unreliable and irrelevant testimony").
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question remains, however, as to how courts are to evaluate the
reliability of nonscientific experts when such experts are "experien-
tially qualified. 157
B. Potential Standards For The Admissibility Of Nonscientific
Testimony
1. Reviving Frye
One proposed standard for the admissibility of nonscientific tes-
timony suggests reviving the Frye "general acceptance" test.'5 8 In
its application, the Frye test excludes any testimony in which the
expert arrives at his or her conclusions in a manner different than
that generally accepted by people in that area of expertise. 59
The same problems that Frye's restrictive test presented with re-
gard to scientific testimony apply to the nonscientific arena. 160
Consider the testimony of a design engineering expert who devel-
ops a cutting edge safety latch for a product.1 61 Under Frye, testi-
mony that a manufacturer could have implemented such a device
would be excluded because it is not yet generally accepted in the
relevant community. 162 This is problematic because nonscientific
experts often replace methodology with experience, 63 and non
scientific experts can rarely establish a generally accepted method-
ology because testimony based on subjective experience may not
be generally accepted by other experts who have not had the same
experience. Therefore, courts should not apply the Frye test to
nonscientific testimony.
157. Strong, supra note 137, at 368; see Imwinkelried, supra note 16, at 2292 (stating
that the reliability of a nonscientific expert increases when an expert has had substan-
tial experience in the field).
158. Frye, 293 F. at 1014; see Imwinkelried, supra note 16, at 2284; see also supra
notes 21-25 (discussing the Frye test).
159. See supra notes 21-25 and. accompanying text.
160. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
161. See Peitzmeier v. Hennessy Indus., Inc., 97 F.3d 293, 297 (8th Cir. 1996) (ex-
cluding the testimony of a design engineering expert, who testified that the defendant
could have used an alternative safety device on a tire changer, because the expert had
not tested any of the proposed devices or subjected them to peer review).
162. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
163. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
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2. Literal Application of the Daubert Factors to Nonscientific
Testimony
The Sixth Circuit's literal application of the Daubert test to non-
scientific testimony164 presents glaring problems because not all
nonscientific testimony can be subject to Daubert's four factors. 165
For example, the "falsifiable experimental testing"'166 and "rate of
error"167 requirements are applicable only when the expert relies
on some kind of methodology, 68 and thus have little bearing on
the reliability of an expert who is testifying on general principles
gathered from years of experience in a particular area. Moreover,
expert testimony based on personal experience cannot always be
evaluated on the basis of "peer review"169 or "general accept-
ance,"' 70 although such testimony may be as valuable to the trier of
fact as those opinions that are easily gauged in such terms. There-
fore, the Daubert factors are not tailored to suit the specific con-
cerns that arise when determining whether to admit nonscientific
expert testimony. 17 1
The first Daubert factor is perhaps the most inapplicable to non-
scientific testimony.'72 Falsifiable experimental testing is employed
to check scientific testimony for the presence of objective stan-
dards. 7 3 However, nonscientific testimony is often subjective. 174
With years of experience in a particular field that is not based on
164. See Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1350-51 (6th Cir. 1994); supra note
108 and accompanying text.
165. See Lisa M. Agrimonti, Note, The Limitations of Daubert and Its Misapplica-
tion to Quasi-Scientific Experts, A Two-Year Case Review Of Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, 35 WASHBURN L.J. 134, 144 (stating that applying the Daubert fac-
tors to nonscientific evidence is, "at best, absurd" and demonstrating through a hypo-
thetical situation how the Daubert factors are ill suited to assess the reliability of
nonscientific testimony); infra notes 173-187 and accompanying text (discussing that
the Daubert factors are tailored to the specific concerns associated with scientific testi-
mony and are not well suited to address the reliability of nonscientific testimony).
166. See supra note 70.
167. See supra note 72.
168. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993); supra notes 46-
47 and accompanying text (defining scientific testimony as that in which the expert's
conclusions are grounded in sound methodology); supra, note 77 and accompanying
text (noting that the Daubert court limited the discussion to the scientific context).
169. See supra note 71.
170. See supra note 73.
171. See Agrimonti, supra note 165, at 144 (demonstrating the difficulty in applying
the Daubert factors to nonscientific expert testimony).
172. See Sheiness, supra note 127, at 490 (noting that the requirement of empirical
testing for experts whose sources are not susceptible to verifications is too restrictive).
173. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593 (citing C. HEMPEL, PHILOSOPHY OF NATURAL
SCIENCE 49 (1966) and K. POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH
OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 35 (5th ed. 1989)).
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Newtonian Science,175 an expert may be able to provide useful in-
formation without demonstrating a particular methodology, and
thus a way must be found to uniformly gauge the reliability of the
expert's testimony.176
Daubert's rate of error factor is similarly inapplicable to non-
scientific testimony. The purpose of the rate of error requirement
is to ensure that the methodology is employed the same way every
time. 177 Thus, if a consistent methodology is not applied each time
the theory is proffered, there can be no evaluation of rate of er-
174. See supra note 134-37 and accompanying text (demonstrating through a hypo-
thetical example how a nonscientific expert's testimony can be subjective).
175. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text (defining the concept of
Newtonian Science).
176. A recent Second Circuit case, Stagl v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 117 F.3d 76 (2d Cir.
1997), illustrates this principle. The Stagl court vacated the trial court's exclusion of
the testimony of a mechanical engineer whose expertise was in the area of human-
machine interaction. See id. at 82. The expert suggested that the interaction between
the baggage claim system employed by Delta and the passengers trying to claim their
baggage caused the plaintiff's injury when she was knocked to the ground, breaking
her hip, by a passenger retrieving a bag from the carousel. See id. at 78. While the
district court concluded that the expertise offered was too general, the Second Circuit
found value in the testimony despite its lack of methodology stating that, "Where, as
here, well-trained people with somewhat more general qualifications are available, it
is error to exclude them." Id. at 82. A hypothetical example of this is the FBI agent
who is called to testify to a drug dealer's modus operandi. He or she may confidently
say just by looking at a particular scenario that it is indicative of the way drug deals
are usually performed. According to the first prong of Daubert, unless the FBI
agent's theory had been tested, it would be deemed unreliable. Such was the case in
Berry, in which the Sixth Circuit applied Daubert to a police officer's testimony that
the Detroit Police Department's failure to properly discipline officers was the proxi-
mate cause of an office shooting the victim. See Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342,
1347 (6th Cir. 1994). The Berry court applied the first prong of Daubert, inquiring
whether or not the officer's discipline theory had been tested. See id. at 1350. Clearly
the court would want to make sure the officer's testimony has some basis in either
observations or calculations. However, because the officer was testifying to a behav-
ioral theory, experimental testing would not be as feasible. See Laser, supra note 14,
at 1411 (noting that it is doubtful that any single experiment could conclusively show
the effects of a failure to discipline police officers over a period of time). Accordingly,
the Sixth Circuit found that the theory had not been tested and this factor went to the
exclusion of the expert when in fact the testimony may have been reliable. See Berry,
25 F.3d at 1350.
177. See United States v. Smith, 869 F.2d 348, 353-54 (7th Cir. 1989) (considering
the expert's rate of error in assessing the reliability of spectrographic voice
identification).
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ror. 78 This is the one factor even the Berry court could not apply
to nonscientific testimony.1 79
Although the publication and peer review aspect of Daubert is
commonly applied to nonscientific testimony,'180 it is also science
specific.' 81 Peer review indicates reliability in science because it is
common practice for scientists to publish in scientific journals and
subject their research and findings to review by their peers. 82
Nonscientific experts may not always publish their theories, how-
ever, because many particularized areas of expertise usually do not
generate sufficient interest. 83
It is the job of a scientist to gather data, make calculations, and
report on any findings. Nonscientific experts, on the other hand,
usually are professionals in their field called to testify about their
particular experience and may not be as accustomed to the prac-
tices of publishing and peer review as scientists 184 as they are not as
common for nonscientific experts. 85 Finally, peer review is not al-
ways a guarantor of sound testimony. Any group espousing uncon-
ventional views can establish a journal for peer review and the lack
of quality control in such journals makes suspect any assurance of
reliability. 86
178. See Laser, supra note 14, at 1413. The Berry court found the officer's testi-
mony to be unreliable on the other Daubert factors, peer review and general accept-
ance. Although the officer claimed to have published some articles and a textbook,
there was no peer review. See Berry, 25 F.3d at 1349-50.
179. See id.; see also Laser, supra note 14, at 1413.
180. See Oh, supra note 9, at 561.
181. See Agrimonti, supra, note 165, at 144.
182. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993). The Daubert
court found peer review relevant to the inquiry of the reliability of scientific testimony
stating, "submission to the scrutiny of the scientific community is a component of
'good science' in part because it increases the likelihood that substantive flaws in
methodology will be detected." Id.
183. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593 (stating that peer review is relevant but not dis-
positive in assessing the scientific validity of a particular technique or methodology on
which an opinion is premised); David F. Horrobin, The Philosophical Basis of Peer
Review and the Suppression of Innovation, 263 JAMA 1438 (1990) (stating that well-
grounded but innovative theories may not be published); see also J. ZIMAN, AN Ex-
PLORATION OF THE GROUNDS FOR BELIEF IN SCIENCE 130-33 (1978); Relman & An-
gell, How Good is Peer Review?, 321 NEW. ENG. J. MED 827 (1989).
184. See Laser, supra note 14, at 1413 ("Only in the formal, traditional sciences is
there an established practice of publication and peer review.").
185. See id.
186. See Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988) (rejecting
testimony based on "clinical ecology" because the entire field of expertise is
unreliable).
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3. Judges as Gatekeepers
Daubert's gatekeeping function for trial judges transcends any
qualitative differences between scientific and nonscientific testi-
mony.187 In a recent case, Thornton v. Caterpillar,'88 the judge
found that the Daubert factors did not apply to the proffered testi-
mony of a mechanical engineer because the test was never meant
to be applied to testimony that is nonscientific in nature. 89 The
judge emphasized the differences between admissibility and relia-
bility, and stated that admissibility is for the judge to decide while
reliability is for the jury.1 90 This notion is implausible. While juries
evaluate the relative credibility of witnesses, judges should be re-
sponsible for keeping all unreliable "junk" testimony out of their
courtrooms, not simply "junk science.' ' 9 1
The proliferation of "guns for hire"'192 in trials also makes it es-
sential that judges carefully screen nonscientific testimony. 93
Although it is illegal to compensate a lay witness with anything of
value, 94 paying an expert witness for testimony is permissible and
187. One way judges have ensured reliability to a limited extent is by scrutinizing
the qualifications of each expert to appear in his or her court. See Strong, supra note
140, at 363 ("[Tlhe question of the reliability of the general propositions utilized by
the expert is conveniently subsumed under the question of the qualification of the
expert witness.").
188. 951 F. Supp. 575 (D.S.C. 1997).
189. See id. at 577.
190. See id.
191. See United States v. Webb, 115 F.3d 711 (9th Cir. 1997) (J. Jenkins, concur-
ring). Judge Jenkins reasoned that although the Daubert factors could not be applied
to the specialized knowledge of law enforcement:
We cannot be suggesting that the district court examine less rigorously the
specialized knowledge underlying proffered nonscientific testimony, or that
the district court may abdicate its role as gatekeeper where the subject mat-
ter does not depend on the scientific method. The trial court's role as gate-
keeper concerning nonscientific "specialized knowledge" proves equally
crucial to the integrity of the trial process ....
Id. at 717.
192. "Guns for hire" is a term which portrays experts as paid employees working as
advocates to persuade the jury of the client's position. See Berry v. City of Detroit, 25
F.3d 1342, 1349 (6th Cir. 1994) (noting that in the age of "experts for hire," it is not
inconceivable for a party to purchase experts with impressive credentials to testify for
the party's benefit); Laser, supra note 14, at 1409 ("In the age of 'experts for hire,' it is
not inconceivable for a party to 'purchase' persons with impressive credentials to say
what the party wants them to say."); see also Perrin, supra note 2, at 1453.
193. See Watkins v. Telsmith, Inc., 121 F.3d 984, 1991 (5th Cir.) (stating that regard-
less of what kind of testimony is proffered, the allocation of Daubert's reliability prin-
ciples is "germane to evaluating whether the expert is a hired gun or a person whose
opinion in the courtroom will withstand the same scrutiny that it would among his
professional peers").
194. 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) (1988).
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indeed expected. 195 This has created a market for experts in which
lawyers purchase the expert who can best convince a jury of their
client's position, regardless of whether the expert's conclusions are
well founded. 196 It has even been noted that a "fool with a small
flair for acting and mathematics might be a more successful witness
than, say, Einstein. "197
As paid advocates, experts can be vehicles for pervasive corrup-
tion in courtrooms because they have a financial incentive to ad-
vance the case of the party who hires them.198 That experts will
begin testifying free of charge is unlikely, 99 so it is incumbent upon
the judiciary to ensure that both scientific and nonscientific expert
testimony is reliable and not prepared in anticipation of the
litigation.2 °°
4. Amending Rule 702
The extension of Daubert's gatekeeping requirement to non-
scientific testimony would be best accomplished by adopting an
amendment to Rule 702. In 1991, the Advisory Committee on
Civil Rules to the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States pro-
posed an amendment to the rule. 20 1 The proposed amendment ex-
pressly added a "reasonable" reliability requirement which was
195. 18 U.S.C. § 201(d).
196. See Perrin, supra note 2, at 1415-16 ("Lawyers shop for experts, ultimately
choosing the one that talks right, looks right, has the right credentials, and will work
with the lawyer in the development of her opinions.").
197. Id. (citing GERRY SPENCE, WITH JUSTICE FOR NONE 270 (1989)).
198. See Trower v. Jones, 520 N.E.2d 297, 300 (Il. 1988) (noting that a favorable
verdict will enable the expert to establish a "track record"). Perrin, supra note 2, at
1414 (arguing that experts have an interest in advancing the case so they are retained
in the future).
199. See Perrin, supra note 2, at 1413 (acknowledging that many experts are profes-
sional experts who make a living testifying in court).
200. See Schofield, supra note 137, at 515 (stating that the Compton court should
have inquired into whether the expert's testimony was prepared solely for the litiga-
tion). See also Joe S. Cecil & Thomas E. Willging, Accepting Daubert's Invitation:
Defining A Role For Court-Appointed Experts In Assessing Scientific Validity, 43 Em-
ory L.J. 995, 996 (1994) (suggesting an alternative way for judges to ensure the relia-
bility of expert testimony by utilizing court-appointed experts pursuant to Federal
Rule of Evidence. 706).
201. The proposed amendment reads:
Testimony providing scientific, technical, or other specialized information, in
the form of opinion or otherwise, may be permitted only if (1) the informa-
tion is reasonably reliable and will substantially assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, and (2) the witness is
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education
to provide such testimony.
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implicitly stated in Daubert.°2 Although such a requirement prop-
erly focuses attention on the problem of reliability, the proposal
provides neither a definition of what "information is reasonably
reliable," nor guidance in applying such a reliability standard.2 °3
While the application of the Frye test is unduly limiting, this pro-
posed amendment is too broad to be very useful.
C. Proposal
Rule 702 should be amended to effectively implement a reliabil-
ity requirement and compel the judiciary to embrace its gatekeep-
ing role in the admission of both scientific and nonscientific
testimony. The amendment should address the problem of reliabil-
ity in nonscientific testimony by providing a clear standard and
framework for judges to follow, rather than requiring them to
make a case by case inquiry, determining whether the particular
testimony proffered is sufficiently scientific in nature, and thus sub-
ject to Daubert's enhanced reliability scrutiny. Taking these factors
into consideration, I propose the following amendment to Rule
702:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
substantially assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
to determine a fact in issue, a witness, qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
in the form of opinion or otherwise if the testimony is shown to
be reasonably reliable.
Testimony will be considered reasonably reliable if it is based
upon sufficient facts, data, opinions, explanatory theory or rea-
soning i) which is generally accepted in the relevant specialized
community or ii) if the testimony is shown to be not generally
accepted, the party offering the testimony proves by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that the testimony is otherwise reliable
including a demonstration that sound principles have been ap-
plied reliably to the facts of the case, the witness is testifying in
accordance with the same intellectual rigor applied in his or her
Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 137 F.R.D. 53, 156 (1991).
202. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993); supra note 76
and accompanying text.
203. See Imwinkelried, supra note 16, at 2287 (noting that the proposal avoided the
challenge of developing reliability standards and thus "points up the problem but con-
tributes nothing to the solution").
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professional practice, and the field of expertise is known to
reach reliable results.20 4
204. This proposal incorporates elements of two of the many proposed amend-
ments to Rule 702, reviewed by the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of
Evidence in 1997, and one proposal recently approved to be recommended to the
Standing Committee in April, 1998.
The first reviewed proposal provides:
Testimony providing scientific, technical or other specialized information, in
the form of an opinion, or otherwise, may be permitted only if (1) the infor-
mation is based upon adequate underlying facts, data or opinions, (2) the
information is based upon an explanative theory either (a) established to
have gained widespread acceptance in the particular field to which the ex-
planative theory belongs, or (b) shown to possess particularized earmarks of
trustworthiness, (3) the witness is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training or education to provide such information, and (4) the
information will substantially assist the trier of fact to understand the evi-
dence or to determine a fact in issue.
MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE (4th ed. 1996). One ar-
guable problem with the proposal discussed in the Advisory Committee Reporter's
comment is the vagueness of the language "particularized earmarks of trustworthi-
ness" and "substantially assist." Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence Reporter's Comment, October, 1997 (on file with author). The amendment
proposed in this Note, including a provision entailing what judges should consider in
evaluating trustworthiness or reliability, will remedy this problem. The second re-
viewed proposal reads,
A witness may testify, in the form of an opinion or otherwise, concerning
scientific, technical, or other specialized information that will assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, but only if
(1) the information is reasonably reliable, and (2) the witness is qualified as
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education to provide
that testimony.
Information normally will be considered reasonably reliable if it is based on
premises, or derived from techniques, having significant support and accept-
ance within the relevant specialized community. A party seeking to object
to a witness testifying thereto must show by a preponderance of the evidence
that the information is not reasonably reliable.
Information based on premises or derived from techniques not having signif-
icant support and acceptance within the relevant specialized community will
not be considered reasonably reliable. A party seeking to have an expert
base testimony on this type of information must show by a preponderance of
the evidence that this testimony is reasonably reliable.
Alan Tamarelli, Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals: Pushing the Limits of Scientific Reliability, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1175
(1994). A problem with this proposal is that it does not specifically state how a party
might overcome a presumption of unreliability. See Advisory Committee on the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence Reporter's Comment, October, 1997 (on file with author).
The amendment proposed in this Note suggests that the additional inquiries as to
whether the witness is adhering to the same standards of intellectual rigor required in
the witness' field will provide a solution to this problem. The proposed amendment
recently approved by the Advisory Committee to be recommended to the standing
committee provides,
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
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This proposal goes further than simply suggesting a reliability
requirement because it provides a specific standard by which to
apply the reliability requirement. °5 The guideline for what is nor-
mally considered "reasonably reliable" will eliminate confusion
and inconsistent application in courts because judges will have a
clear standard which they can uniformly apply. 0 6 Moreover, the
proposal also is flexible and broad enough to ensure the reliability
of all expert testimony because the reliability requirement applies
to both scientific and nonscientific testimony.207
This proposal may seem similar to the Frye "general acceptance"
test because it states that information is reasonably reliable if it has
significant support within the relevant specialized community.20 8
The proposal does not, however, absolutely preclude theories that
are not generally accepted within the relevant community of exper-
tise.20 9 Although it is based on the assumption that general accept-
ance is the primary indicator of reliability, it provides a burden
shifting proposition, l0 which enables reliable testimony to be
heard even if it has not gained general acceptance.
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise provided that (1)
the testimony is sufficiently based upon reliable facts or data (2) the testi-
mony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness
has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence proposal approved to be rec-
ommended to the Standing Committee, April 6, 1998 (on file with author). This pro-
posal recognizes the significance of evaluating whether an expert has not only applied
a sound methodology, but that the methodology is applied appropriately to the facts
of the case. See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 745 (3d Cir. 1994)
(noting the importance of a methodology being properly applied to the specific facts
of a case).
205. See supra note 200 (discussing the 1991 proposed amendment which simply
suggests a reliability requirement for all expert testimony without providing a frame-
work for how such a requirement would be implemented).
206. See Schofield, supra note 137, at 515 ("Without a uniform standard, an expert's
testimony that is likely to fail under Daubert's scientific factors could be repackaged
under the guise of technical or nonscientific evidence and avoid Daubert['s enhanced
scrutiny].").
207. The proposal applies to both scientific and nonscientific specialized or techni-
cal knowledge.
208. See supra notes 22-29 and accompanying text
209. See supra note 28.
210. Initially, the party opposing the testimony bears the burden of proving it to be
unreliable and if that is accomplished, the testimony is excluded. See FED R. EvI.
702. However, this amendment proposes that once the testimony is proven to be
unreliable because it lacks general acceptance, the burden shifts back to the party
offering the testimony to show that it is indeed reliable despite the lack of general
acceptance.
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If a party opposing an expert's testimony shows the testimony is
not generally accepted, the party offering the testimony has an op-
portunity to show that the testimony is indeed reliable and over-
come the presumption of unreliability. The proposal suggests that
a way to overcome this presumption is by demonstrating that the
testimony would withstand scrutiny by other experts in the field.
The "general acceptance" in this proposal is different from that re-
quired by Frye because the proposal does not mandate that an ex-
pert use a generally accepted methodology. Rather, an expert may
establish that the reasoning which led to the conclusions advanced
would be generally accepted. Expert witnesses must establish a
similarity between their professional practice or experience and the
proffered testimony,211 which includes the inquiry into whether the
witness has employed the same reasoning 212 that other experts in
the field use to base their conclusions.213 Moreover, the proposal
suggests that part of ensuring whether a witness' methodology or
reasoning is reliable is examining whether it has been appropriately
211. See Tassin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 946 F. Supp. 1241 (M.D. La. 1996) (hold-
ing that in the context of engineering testimony, when the expert's opinions are based
on technical expertise, rigid compliance with the Daubert factors is not necessary as
long as the expert provides a reasonable link between the information and procedures
he uses and his conclusions); Imwinkelried, supra note 16, at 2292-92 (stating that the
reliability of an expert increases with the more experiences an expert has and the
similarity of those experiences to the testimony in question).
212. See Schofield, supra, note 137, at 508 (stating that although nonscientific ex-
perts may not use a complicated methodology, all experts should base their conclu-
sions on some methodology, reasoning or principle; for example, past experience
constitutes part of a methodology through which an expert might adequately base a
conclusion).
213. The additional inquiry as to whether the expert is adhering to the same stan-
dards of intellectual rigor required in the expert's field will help establish that the
expert is not a "hired gun" who has prepared the testimony solely for the litigation.
See Sheehan v. Daily Racing Form, Inc., 104 F.3d 940, 942 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting the
importance of an expert being "as careful as he would be in his regular professional
work outside his paid litigation consulting"); Braun v. Lorillard Incorporated, 84 F. 3d
230 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that the proper inquiry in evaluating the reliability of
expert testimony should be what sort of data other professionals in the same field
would require to support their conclusions); Schofield, supra note 137, at 511. Scho-
field argues:
Perhaps one of the best indicators as to whether an expert's reasoning or
methodology is reliable is whether the expert has followed the criterion es-
tablished in his profession. An expert should not be able to have his testi-
mony admitted in court on standards that are less thai what is expected in
the expert's field.
Id. The application of such an inquiry would be to require lawyers, for example, to
substantiate their legal conclusions in court with case law and statutes as they do
routinely in their professional practice. See also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. 43
F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1995); Laser, supra note 14, at 1418.
[Vol. XXV
1998] ADMISSIBILITY OF NONSCIENTIFIC TESTIMONY 573
applied to the facts of the case. 14 The requirement that an expert's
field of expertise is known to reach reliable results will preclude
the possibility that an expert might be able to satisfy that he or she
has adhered to the intellectual rigor of an unreliable practice. 15
The proposal has the additional advantage of promoting judicial
efficiency by having the relevant community of expertise, rather
than the courts, determine the validity of the expert's testimony.216
The fields of scientific and nonscientific knowledge are so di-
verse 217 that it would be extremely burdensome to compel judges
to become sufficiently learned in a particular area in order to assess
the reliability of an expert testifying in that area. 218 This still may
be required in rare cases where there is either not a large enough
community of expertise to evaluate an expert's reasoning or lack of
consensus within a community regarding acceptable standards.219
However, in the majority of cases which do not present these is-
sues, the proposal will allow judges to focus on their gatekeeping
responsibilities rather than becoming "amateur experts. '220
The Tenth Circuit case, Compton v. Subaru of America, Inc., 22
best illustrates the practical application and utility of this proposal.
The Compton court held that where expert testimony is based on
general engineering principles gathered from years of experience,
rather than any particular methodology, performing a Daubert reli-
ability inquiry is not necessary.222 Although the expert's reasoning
214. See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 745 (3d Cir. 1994) (stating
that "any step that renders the analysis unreliable renders the expert's testimony
inadmissible," and that this is true "whether the step completely changes a reliable
methodology or merely misapplies that methodology").
215. See Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988) (rejecting
the testimony of a "clinical ecologist" because the field is unreliable).
216. See Polentz, supra note 4, at 1189 (citing Reed v. State, 391 A.2d 364, 371-72
(Md. 1978) (justifying the adoption of the Frye test as a means of allowing the scien-
tific community to make the determination on the validity of the testimony)).
217. See supra notes 35-45 and accompanying text (providing examples of different
kinds of expert testimony).
218. See Oh, supra note 9, at 563 ("Judges would be required to acquire sufficient
proficiency in a wide range of expertise.").
219. See id. (noting the problem of there being no consensus in a specific area re-
garding its "essential principles of knowledge").
220. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 600-01 (1993) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("I do not doubt that Rule 702 confides to
the judge some gatekeeping responsibility in deciding questions of the admissibility of
proffered expert testimony. But I do not think it imposes on them either the obliga-
tion or the authority to become amateur scientists in order to perform that role.").
221. 82 F.3d 1513 (10th Cir. 1996); see supra, note 85-88 and accompanying text.
222. See id at 1520. This decision suggested that an expert would be able to get
around a reliability inquiry by saying that no methodology was implemented to reach
the expert's conclusions and that the job of evaluating the credibility of the expert
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was unreliable, z23 the court nonetheless admitted the testimony be-
cause the expert had sufficient qualifications and testified to rele-
vant subject matter.224
Under the proposed amendment, the party offering such an ex-
pert would have to establish that his or her conclusions are based
on "adequate underlying facts, data, or opinion" and are "reason-
ably reliable," instead of focusing on the qualifications of the ex-
pert.225 If Subaru was able to demonstrate that the expert
presented unreliable testimony, the expert would have had the op-
portunity to rebut this presumption by showing that he used stan-
dard engineering principles, thereby adhering to the intellectual
rigor in his professional field.226 The application of this amend-
ment would fill the reliability gap left by a sole inquiry into the
expert's qualifications and relevance.227
Conclusion
In areas of nonscientific expertise, where testimony rarely is
based on a specific methodology, and thus is not adaptable to the
four Daubert factors, the trial judge must still ensure that the testi-
mony is reliable. While the fear of "junk science" pervading court-
rooms compels judges to scrutinize scientific testimony, it is equally
important that nonscientific testimony be grounded in well-rea-
soned and nonspeculative theory. Accordingly, Rule 702 should be
amended to require trial judges to embrace their gatekeeping role
with regard to all types of expert testimony. The proposed amend-
ment resolves the inconsistent application of Daubert by providing
a clear standard for judges to follow and affords the best solution
for ensuring the reliability of nonscientific testimony.
may be left to the jury. In addition, it is unlikely that a jury would be any better able
to assess the reliability of engineering principles than scientific principles.
223. In Compton, the experts opinion, that the plaintiff's car was defectively
designed because it allowed excessive roof crush, was "questionable and lacked relia-
bility," and the judge remarked that the expert's testimony was "more applicable to a
Sherman tank than to any vehicle which the ordinary consumer would drive."
Compton, 82 F.3d at 1516; see Schofield, supra note 137, at 490.
224. See Compton, 82 F.3d at 1518.
225. See supra, Part III.C.
226. See id.
227. See supra note 117 and accompanying text (discussing why the traditional ap-
plication of Rule 702 to nonscientific testimony is problematic).
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